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‘Our struggle for global sustainability will be lost or won in cities.’
Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General (2012)
5.1 Introduction
Cities and local communities will play a key role in climate change adaptation and
mitigation (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003; Parnell, 2016; Jayne and Ward, 2017).
Already in Local Agenda 21 (UNCED, 1992), adopted at the Earth Summit in Rio
de Janeiro in 1992, they were recognised and explicitly mentioned as an important
site for climate action. Fast forward to the mid-2010s: the Climate Summit for
Local Leaders was hosted, in parallel to the Paris Conference of the Parties (COP)
in 2015. This event was attended by many urban leaders and gained much recogni-
tion in the climate negotiations that resulted in the Paris Agreement. At COP22 in
Marrakech in 2016, the parallel Climate Summit for Local and Regional Leaders
was held. Again, this event provided cities and other local actors with an opportu-
nity to influence international climate change negotiations. Similarly, cities were
a central focus of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals of 2015.
Meanwhile, the New Urban Agenda resulting from the bi-decennial HABITAT
Conference in 2016 has a strong focus on the role of cities in climate change
mitigation and adaptation (United Nations, 2016).
When surveying these developments, one might easily assume that cities are
already an integral part of international climate governance (see Chapter 4).
Unfortunately, the reality is less positive. In international policymaking, cities
are not recognised as formal actors – after all, cities are sites as well as actors
when it comes to climate action. They still have to break through institutional
boundaries to make themselves heard at international climate negotiations and
be recognised in international agreements. The side events at the COPs are
exactly that – side events, not formal parts of the negotiations – and the
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Sustainable Development Goals, for example, are not even referenced in the
Paris Agreement. Moreover, the Paris Agreement does not explicitly refer to
cities, urban geographies or local settlements as actors or sites of governing,
but mentions ‘country-driven’ processes as the key principle for organising
climate action (United Nations, 2015: Articles 7, 9 and 11). In short, there is
much talk at the international level about the importance of urban climate
governance, but little is done to empower cities – as actors – taking meaningful
action, nor is there much coordination or cohesion between the different
international forums engaged with climate change governance in how they
envisage the role of cities in climate action.
In response, cities themselves have become involved, as actors, in local and
international climate governance interventions, experiments and networks
(Hoffmann, 2011; van der Heijden, 2014; Bulkeley, Castán Broto and Edwards,
2015). This is illustrative of polycentric governance – albeit that cities and the
networks they form can best be understood as units within a polycentric system
rather than a specific domain (cf. Ostrom, 2010). That is, acting as (partly)
independent actors, city governments and other urban leaders have begun to
organise themselves around specific urban climate challenges to better understand
how these can best be addressed. They do so on regional, national and international
scales, following more or less formalised rules. Thus, we see multiple governing
authorities acting, as explained in this chapter, at different scales, and exercising
considerable independence in making and implementing norms and rules – i.e.
matching the essential definition of polycentric governance identified in Chapter 1
(see also Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren, 1961; Ostrom, 1990).
In what follows, three related topics are addressed to better explain the role of
cities as units of polycentric climate governance. First, cities often set higher
climate governance ambitions than the nation states they are in (Reckien et al.,
2014). What explains this tendency of cities seeking to outperform and thus act
independently of national governments? Second, cities are increasingly becoming
sites and actors of experimentation with innovative governance instruments,
including eco-financing and ‘urban laboratories’ (van der Heijden, 2016b). What
drives cities to experiment with innovative governance instruments in the first
place? Third, cities have begun to break out of traditional top-down, national-
regional-local hierarchies and act in trans-local networks (Acuto and Rayner,
2016). How do these networks seek to overcome regional and national barriers to
climate governance, and what barriers do these networks raise themselves for cities
in responding to climate change? Finally, whilst the literature on these three topics –
and polycentric urban climate governance more broadly – has expanded rapidly
since the early 2000s, it has a strong focus on a relatively small number of cities
from the global North (Evans, Karvonen and Raven, 2016). This chapter therefore
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concludes with a reflection on how applicable it is for all cities in the world –
including, crucially, those in the global South. It also identifies what further
research is required to understand and support the full potential that cities hold as
actors in – and sites of – polycentric climate governance.
5.2 High Ambitions at the Local Level
From the early 2000s onwards, cities have been in a healthy competition to be at the
forefront of emission reduction efforts. For example, Sydney aims to cut its
emissions by 70 per cent from 2006 levels by 2030, and New York has set itself
the goal of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 80 per cent below 2005 levels
by 2050. What makes the ambitions of these cities – and others like them (C40
Research Team and Arup, 2014) – of particular interest is that they go above and
beyond the ambitions set by their respective nation states. Indeed, Sydney and
New York’s ambitions are more than double those of their respective countries.
Comparing city-level emissions and reduction ambitions with those of nation states
is somewhat like comparing apples and oranges (emissions from carbon-intensive
sectors such as manufacturing and mining are normally not included in city
emissions). Nevertheless, the size of this difference begs a question: why do cities
set such ambitious mitigation targets in the first place?
In answer to this question, various reasons are highlighted in the literature. These
can be clustered into four main themes: cities as a source and victim of climate
change; cities as the low-hanging fruit in climate action; the rise of green growth
and ecological modernisation thinking in cities; and national political support for
urban climate action.
Starting with the first of these, cities are often considered both a key contributor
to and a main victim of climate change. Most resources, including energy, are
consumed in cities, and most wastes, including carbon emissions, are produced in
cities. This makes cities – and particularly the high consumerist lifestyle that
characterises modern urban life – a key contributor to climate change (Dodman,
2009). Because cities are often characterised by high population densities, and
because cities represent the geographical epicentre of many economic activities, it
will be in cities where climate change–related and other disasters will strike the
hardest (IPCC, 2014). Seeking to prevent the devastating effects of such disasters,
or simply seeking to save on the costs of operating cities by reducing waste or
resource consumption, city governments around the world have implemented
myriad regulatory interventions, subsidies and taxes to steer citizens towards
more environmentally sustainable forms of living. A typical example is the emer-
gency energy requirements introduced by the government of Tokyo in 2011. These
were adopted in response to power shortages experienced from closing down all
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nuclear power plants after the Fukushima nuclear power plant incident. Whilst
these emergency requirements aimed at relieving the electricity net, they had the
positive side effect of considerable energy savings (and thus city-related carbon
emission reductions), particularly from large offices. Many large office users
continued their reduced energy consumption after the emergency requirements
were lifted (Nishida, Hua and Okamoto, 2016).
Second, cities have access to much low-hanging fruit. Of all anthropogenic
activities, it is only in constructing, maintaining and using cities (and particularly
the built-up part of cities, or simply, buildings) that we see a unique combination of
well-trialled, readily available technology and knowledge to achieve emission
reductions at net-cost benefit and at a large scale (IPCC, 2014). In many areas –
including manufacturing, agriculture and non-city transport – some of these con-
ditions are also present, but not in the same, unique combination. In the United
States, for example, possible building-related energy savings of up to 23 per cent
are worth double the costs of upfront investments, with a return rate of ten years –
$1.2 trillion can be saved if $520 billion is invested (McKinsey, 2009). Some
studies even go so far as to forecast that fully carbon-neutral built environments can
be achieved in the United States and China by applying all currently available
technologies at a net economic gain (Lovins, 2013). Again, seeking to capitalise on
such expected savings, city governments around the globe have been steering their
citizens to forms of living that are less carbon-intensive than what is formally
required by their national governments.
A third and related argument revolves around the paradigm of green growth or
economic modernisation (Dryzek, 2005). It is often argued, and sometimes
empirically observed, that cities compete with each other to become the most
climate-friendly city, seeking to attract investors and citizens that have a ‘green’
orientation (McCann, 2013). The underlying assumption here is that city policy-
makers are mainly interested in economic prosperity, creating jobs and gaining
votes by keeping citizens happy (Schragger, 2016). By creating an image of
environmental sustainability and climate action and/or rewarding specific forms
of investments, for instance reducing property taxes to encourage more energy-
efficient buildings (van der Heijden, 2015), authorities seek to attract firms. This
in itself can result in job creation. At the same time, creating an image of
environmental sustainability and climate action may attract ‘creative’ people
that may provide an additional boost to the economic competitiveness of a city
(Florida, 2005). Such images run the risk, however, of having a merely symbolic
function, with cities being unable to live up to some of the high promises they
make (Johnson, Toly and Schroeder, 2015).
A final argument, but one that is sometimes hidden between the lines, is that
many cities have set climate change ambitions that are higher than those of the
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nation states they are in simply because they were actually mandated or supported
by national governments to do so (Homsey and Warner, 2015; van der Heijden,
2017; see also Chapter 3). Despite its many flaws, Local Agenda 21 can be credited
for recognising cities and their governments as an important level for climate action
and addressing other societal problems. Following on from Agenda 21, national
governments began requiring, supporting and promoting local action (Bulkeley
and Betsill, 2003; Jayne and Ward, 2017). Returning to the example of Sydney, in
2011 the Australian government launched the National Urban Policy (Australian
Government, 2011). This policy required that all jurisdictions have in place the
planning systems to deliver nine specific goals. These include better urban design,
more environmentally sensitive new homes and offices and preparations for cli-
mate change and natural disasters (Albanese, 2013). Seeking compliance with this
policy, Australian states and territories developed long-term regional and metro-
politan plans and required cities to draw up strategic development plans and
indicate how they were going to meet national requirements. Being exposed to
pressure from higher levels of government as well as urban climate mitigation
ambitions expressed by other cities resulted in a race to the top between Australian
cities to set far-reaching carbon emission reduction ambitions (COAG, 2012).
Therefore, even though cities may behave as partly independent actors in poly-
centric climate governance, the interactions between them and other actors should
be borne in mind.
5.3 Experimental Urban Climate Governance and Innovative
Governance Instruments
Around the globe, cities have also become highly active in experimenting with
novel governance processes and innovative governance instruments to address
local and trans-local climate challenges. This ‘experimental governance’ is char-
acterised by iterative rounds of trialling governance instruments within a bounded
jurisdiction or population, with the ambition to adapt the instruments based on
lessons learnt and to ultimately scale it up to a larger jurisdiction or population
(Hoffmann, 2011; Ansell and Bartenberger, 2016). Scholars have identified hun-
dreds of urban climate governance experiments ranging from very local ones to
some at an international scale (Bai, Roberts and Chen, 2010; Bulkeley and Castán
Broto, 2013; van der Heijden, 2016b). Examples include the Chicago Sustainable
Backyards programme that incentivises households to create water-efficient gar-
dens, through to the international Transition Towns Network that provides tools
and processes for citizens to take local climate action (van der Heijden, 2014).
These experiments seek to act on barriers that stand in the way of effective urban
climate action. Such barriers may be political or legal (such as the difficulty of
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mandating retrofits and upgrades for existing parts of cities), financial (such as split
incentives between those who pay and those who gain from urban climate action),
technological/behavioural (such as a mismatch between sustainable design and
sustainable use of cities) and social (such as the risk of negatively affecting
disadvantaged groups by requiring costly climate action) (van der Heijden, 2017).
The turn to experimental urban climate governance observed since the early
2000s is more than a pragmatic, local government–led approach to solving pro-
blems experienced in implementing national requirements (see Chapter 6). Urban
climate governance experiments bring together local governments, private actors
and civil society actors in formal and structured processes of developing, demon-
strating and trialling new forms of authority and governance instruments to address
climate challenges at the city level (Bulkeley et al., 2015). Scholars are confident
about their ability to draw lessons from experiments about what governance
interventions work, where and how, and to scale them up or extend them out across
the city in question, and even to other cities and countries (Sassen, 2015).
But what drives cities to experiment with innovative governance instruments in
the first place? Again, the literature identifies various motivations. A first and
somewhat structuralist understanding relates to the privatisation of (local) public
service delivery that started in the 1970s (Hodge, 2000; van der Heijden, 2010), the
‘reinventing of government’ and implementation of new public management
practices since the 1980s (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Hood, 1995) and the larger
shift from government to governance that has been documented since the late
1990s (Rhodes, 1996, 2007). City governments are no longer considered the
executive branch of national governments, merely implementing national legisla-
tion and regulation (Pierre, 2011). They are increasingly expected to deliver local
services themselves (or have local services delivered by others) in an effective and
efficient manner, and have to be transparent about their actions and be fully
accountable for these – for instance through ‘smart city’ rankings and urban climate
indexes (López-Ruiz, Alfaro-Navarro and Nevado-Peña, 2014). Facing these
increasing expectations – and often assuming that satisfying them aids local
economic development (an expectation that is not always based on sound evidence;
see Schragger, 2016) – local governments then have little choice but to reach out to
local private and civil society actors and search for innovative governance instru-
ments. This is even more the case in a policy area like climate change, where city
governments lack experience or prior knowledge about which interventions yield
the most desirable outcomes.
Another literature assigns more agency to local governments, private and civil
society actors. Rather than considering changing institutional and other structural
conditions as forces that tie them together, it considers that all governments wish to
be actively involved in addressing urban climate challenges in collaborative
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processes and experiments (Bingham, 2006; Hohn and Neuer, 2006). This branch
of the urban climate governance literature has very high hopes and expectations for
the outcomes of these experiments (see Chapter 6). By involving a wide range of
stakeholders in the development of governance instruments, their tacit knowledge
can be used. This is expected to result in instruments that are ‘smarter’ than those
developed by somewhat distant bureaucrats (Lobel, 2012). Also, by involving
a range of stakeholders, instruments can be developed through a consensus-
building process that allows for deeper reflection on the advantages and disadvan-
tages of the instrument for the various parties involved. This is expected to bridge
their diverse and sometimes competing views (Bulkeley and Mol, 2003). It is
further expected to increase the acceptance of the instruments that are developed
and implemented and, correspondingly, to improve compliance with them
(Walters, 2004). In terms of the design of the new governance instruments, scholars
have focused on the move away from traditional deterrence-based, hard-law
instruments that penalise non-compliance, such as building codes, to soft-law
instruments that reward compliance and provide positive incentives. Such positive
incentives come, for example, in the form of information, the ability to advertise
compliant behaviour or some form of financial compensation (van der Heijden,
2016a). Scholars further point to a move away from mandatory governance
instruments towards those that ask for voluntary commitments, again assuming
that compliance is more likely when individuals and firms commit voluntarily to
them (van der Heijden, 2014).
That being said, an emerging body of more empirically informed literature is
rather more critical of the ability of cities to actually deliver on these normative
expectations. It highlights that there is often a normative assumption in the urban
governance literature that all experimentation is beneficial, and that whilst there is
much talk about experiments and innovative instruments, their development
and day-to-day performance are poorly understood (Johnson et al., 2015).
The small empirical knowledge base highlights that challenges abound, and are
particularly found when it comes to scaling-up and scaling-out experiments. For
example, rules and regulations may lag behind to formalise experiments into urban
policy, economic conditions and finance may work against scaling or the experi-
mental setting may not fully reflect the real-world setting an instrument has to
operate in (Bulkeley, 2013; Schroeder, Burch and Rayner, 2013). A specific risk
associated with urban climate governance experiments is that they target frontrun-
ners and not the majority of firms and citizens. Hence, there tends to be a mismatch
between what climate action frontrunners can achieve and what ‘ordinary’ firms
and citizens are willing to accept and are capable of delivering (van der Heijden,
2017).
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In short, experiments are a popular focus for researchers and practitioners, but
whether they will be successful in delivering governance instruments capable of
quickly reducing carbon emissions and resource consumption at the city level
remains an open question. In fact, many experiments have been found to result
only in rather piecemeal solutions at best. Moreover, cities that are considered
leading and lauded for their example-setting roles often are among the ones with
the biggest environmental footprints (Johnson et al., 2015). More problematically,
urban climate experimentation is sometimes used to justify a neo-liberal develop-
ment agenda and not an especially environmentally or socially sustainable one at
that (Evans et al., 2016). For example, it is highly laudable that certain multi-
nationals are collaborating with cities to experiment with new information tech-
nology solutions to reduce vehicle emissions or city-related energy consumption –
so called smart cities. But questions need to be asked about whether they do so out
of altruistic motivations or whether they see this as pilot projects for creating new
markets for their products (van der Heijden, 2014). Of course, both could in
principle be true – hence the desirability of assessing the performance of climate
governance experiments against multiple criteria (see Chapter 14).
5.4 Trans-local Collaborations
Yet another manifestation of polycentric urban climate governance can be found in
the ongoing growth of trans-local or city-to-city networks, as well as a growth of
city-to-citizen and city-to-business networks (van der Heijden, 2016b). Whilst city
networks, city collaborations, sister-city agreements and so on are not a fully novel
development, the active networking of cities in the area of climate action stands out
from earlier, somewhat more passive initiatives (Jayne and Ward, 2017). These
active networks are important but informal bodies at trans-local and international
levels, comprising formal bodies at the local level (Jordan and Turnpenny, 2015).
They allow cities to learn from each other, jointly experiment and seek governance
solutions to urban climate problems and, perhaps most important, to bypass their
national governments in the international arena. Three well-known city networks
are ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability (originally the International
Council for Local Environmental Initiatives), the C40 Cities Climate Leadership
Group and the Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy. The first is an
international network of more than 1,500 cities, towns and regions founded in
1990; the second is a network of more than 80 of the world’s largest cities founded
in 2005; and the third is a network of more than 7,000 local and regional authorities
(mostly from European countries) founded in 2008.
To what extent do these trans-local networks help overcome regional and
national barriers to climate governance, and what barriers do these networks
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themselves raise for cities in responding to climate change? Sometimes
a distinction is made between ‘first-wave’ and ‘second-wave’ networks. The first
attempt made to push cities to act on climate change was made by ICLEI.
It strongly focused on trialling and disseminating knowledge about technological
solutions for climate mitigation. Following on from this, academics began writing
‘best practice’ books that were often linked to the then-popular notion of green
growth and ecological modernisation. The first-wave city networks strongly
revolved around creating knowledge for cities by cities (Jayne and Ward, 2017).
C40 and the Covenant of Mayors can be considered ‘second-wave’ city networks.
For these second-wave city networks, knowledge creation and dissemination is still
important, but they also seek to have the voice of cities included in international
climate negotiations (Johnson et al., 2015; it has been argued that first-wave cities
are now engaged in this too). Representatives of ICLEI, C40 and the Covenant
of Mayors were, for example, highly active at COP21 and COP22 (see earlier).
Such international events allow cities to showcase their best practices, and chal-
lenge their nation states and others to go one step further in their commitments to
climate action.
There is some evidence that city networks help overcome regional and national
barriers to climate governance, including the difficulty of developing and imple-
menting mandatory regulation and the lack of institutional capital in, particularly,
smaller municipalities (van der Heijden, 2014). Progressive cities in less progres-
sive nations may find like-minded cities in more progressive nations – there is an
abundance of information available for members and non-members on the websites
of these networks. By combining resources (funds, staff and so on), these networks
are, in theory, capable of carrying out more rigorous experiments than cities can
achieve on their own (Bansard, Pattberg and Widerberg, 2016). That said, even
though such networks are reporting successes, it remains doubtful how valid these
statements really are. The quality of data underlying the statements is sometimes
questionable, simply because it is exceptionally difficult to measure reductions in
carbon emissions or even energy consumption at the city level (Bulkeley, 2013).
The networks might attract already well-performing cities rather than poor-
performing ones and provide an unrepresentatively high willingness of cities to
take climate action (van der Heijden, 2017). The reported successes might work in
one city but not another. Thus, a big challenge for the climate networks is to find
a balance between providing very general and very tailored information on govern-
ance interventions (Johnson et al., 2015). Finally, cities may seek to join these
networks seeking co-benefits that may not always stem from a genuine concern
about climate change. For example, by participating in the networks, cities hope to
attract investors, new workers and residents (Brenner, 2004; Jonas, Gibbs and
While, 2011).
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In short, while the urban climate governance literature was initially positive
about the opportunities provided by city networks and their potential to spur urban
climate action, recently it has taken a more critical turn. Moving beyond question-
ing the successes reported by these networks, scholars have pointed out that they
easily become ‘networks of pioneers for pioneers’ (Kern and Bulkeley, 2009).
Rather than being all-inclusive, the networks run the risk of becoming exclusive
clubs that only provide benefits (such as knowledge on urban climate action, or
being represented in international climate change negotiations) to their members,
somewhat at odds with some of the normative assumptions of polycentric theory
(see Chapter 1). Others have highlighted that even members of a network do not
always have equal access to all the benefits of membership (Lee, 2015). For
example, cities in the global North may find it easier to bear the costs of sending
representatives to networking events than cities in the global South. An issue that
has received less attention in the literature thus far is that these networks may
produce an illusion of active and successful cities in the area of climate action (van
der Heijden, 2017). While both ICLEI and C40, for example, proudly advertise the
proportion of the global urban population that they affect – 25 and 15 per cent,
respectively (C40, n.d.; ICLEI, n.d.) – it could just as well be argued that after three
decades, many cities are still not members.
Furthermore, by looking at the urban governance experiments and innovative
urban governance instruments that these networks consider illustrative of out-
standing performance, it becomes clear that many only deliver quite moderate
rather than transformative climate action. For example, the C40 network has an
annual awards ceremony, the Climate Change Leadership Awards, to ‘[reward]
important, innovative policies and programmes that reduce emissions and improve
sustainability’ and to ‘recognize those successes, catalyze ambition, and share
lessons with cities around the world’ (C40, n.d.). In 2013, one of these awards
was given to 1200 Buildings in Melbourne, a programme that supports property
owners in finding finance for building retrofits. At the time that it was awarded for
being a ‘world-leading governance innovation for improved urban sustainability’
(C40, n.d.), only a mere five buildings had actually been retrofitted. In 2014, an
award was made to the Amsterdam Climate and Investment Fund, a revolving loan
fund. This was made to the city of Amsterdam for its ‘leading position in the
transition to low-carbon cities’ (C40, n.d.), but at the time it had only issued some
five loans, mainly to support highly conventional technological upgrades of build-
ings (see, for further examples, van der Heijden, 2017). If such action is among the
best within the member cities, one may wonder what the rest are up to, and whether
cities are really being truly challenged by their city networks to take ambitious
climate actions.
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There are, of course, good reasons for these city-to-city networks to provide
their members with exclusive rewards, to put them in the spotlight in the
international arena and to create a narrative of climate activity initiated and
supported by them. The supply of networks is sufficient – to the extent that some
have to compete for members. On a more positive note, showcasing good
practice, however marginal, may spur other cities to take action too. But too
much promise and too few results could just as easily backfire. For example,
whilst ICLEI initially attracted many cities in the United States, substantial
numbers have terminated their memberships as a result of changing political
ideologies, interest group pressures and declining membership benefits (Krause,
Yi and Feicock, 2015). It has been observed that some of these networks have
over time become increasingly neo-liberal, seeking to expand and hold their
membership base. Rather than a race to the top, there is a risk of a race to the
bottom, in which the survival of the network becomes an end in itself (cf.
Johnson et al., 2015). Put differently, the (dominant) city networks may even
become a victim of their own success. With a growing membership base came
a need to professionalise and formalise, but with the move from being voluntary
networks of cities to being large and powerful city interest groups came all the
problems that are typically found in bureaucratic organisations – turf wars,
a focus on quantity over quality and managerialism (see further Wilson,
1989). That said, absent a benchmark of what constitutes ‘good performance’,
it may be difficult for cities and their networks to spur city-level action that is
genuinely transformative. Without that, it is also very difficult to assess the
efficacy of cities as units in systems of polycentric governance.
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter has addressed polycentric urban climate governance in action. When
stepping back and reflecting on the various examples and forms of polycentric
urban climate governance discussed, a number of observations stand out. First,
city governments often set higher climate action ambitions than the nation states
they are in. Second, cities are very active in experimenting with novel climate
governance instruments. In doing so, cities self-organise active collaborations
with private and civil society actors. Third, cities participate in trans-local and
often international networks to develop and share information about urban
climate mitigation and adaptation, and seek to influence international climate
negotiations. Policymakers, practitioners and academics often express high
hopes for city governments and other urban leaders in addressing climate change.
The forms and examples of (polycentric) urban climate governance discussed in
this chapter are repeatedly used to argue that it will be cities rather than nation
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states that will take the most meaningful climate actions in the future (Barber,
2013; Sassen, 2015; Knieling, 2016). One could frame it even more dramatically
than this, as did the former UN Secretary-General, quoted in the epigram of this
chapter.
But how well-founded is Ban Ki-moon’s trust in the capacity of cities (includ-
ing local governments and private and civil society actors) to take meaningful
climate action? In line with other critical scholars (Johnson et al., 2015), this
chapter urges some caution when considering cities ‘the key to addressing the
global climate change problem’ (C40, n.d.; emphasis added). First, some care.
The forms and examples of polycentric urban climate governance discussed in
this chapter point to a growing reliance on private and other non-governmental
actors in collaborative governance processes. Urban governance theory easily
assumes that efficiency through such collaborations and democracy go hand in
hand (Davies and Imbroscio, 2009). Yet the involvement of private and other non-
governmental actors, particularly multinational companies, pushes urban climate
governance further towards neo-liberalism and market-based interventions, and
further strengthens the focus on technological fixes rather than behavioural
change (Johnson et al., 2015). Also, with cities acting independently of their
national governments, national climate policies no longer ensure that all citizens
contribute equally to and benefit from climate action. This begs a need for
stronger accountability systems (see Chapter 19), involving (perhaps elected)
city officials who can represent and look after the interests of all citizens,
especially those more vulnerable to its impacts (Pierre, 2011).
Second, some realism. Whilst the polycentric urban climate governance
literature is burgeoning, scholars – myself included – only tend to focus on
a handful of (leading) cities. More often than not, these are part of the three
main, dominant city networks. The more active cities in these networks – the
ones, incidentally, that receive the most scholarly attention – tend to be larger
cities in the global North. Yet, whilst climate change is on the agenda of some of
the larger cities, particularly in the global North, it should be remembered that in
many others it is not: ‘[c]limate change simply remains “un-governed” in cities’
(Bulkeley, 2013: 104; see also Reckien et al., 2014). In short, we have
substantial knowledge about polycentric urban climate governance in a small
number of predominantly large cities in the global North, but we know very
little about polycentric urban climate governance in general. Hence, we are not
well equipped to determine how far cities are genuinely capable of self-
organising (Johnson et al., 2015) as polycentric theory suggests. This is trou-
bling for two reasons. First, urbanisation is taking place predominantly in the
global South, particularly in Asia and Africa. Solutions that are found to ‘work’
in the global North are often found to generate less positive outcomes when
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transferred to the global South – or even have negative outcomes there (Gupta
et al., 2015; van der Heijden, 2017). Second, it remains unclear whether the
trends visible in large cities are also found in smaller ones (Sassen, 2001).
Smaller cities likely face different barriers than larger cities and have fewer
capacities than their larger neighbours. Hence, solutions that are found to ‘work’
in larger cities may not easily transpose to smaller ones (Homsey and Warner,
2015).
Third, some downscaling of expectations. Following on from these points, the
evidence base to support claims about the opportunities and constraints of (poly-
centric) urban climate governance is thin at best – and at worse may be imbued
with a great deal of wishful thinking. There is no doubt that city governments and
other local leaders (including private and civil society actors) are organising
themselves around specific urban climate challenges to better understand how
these can be addressed, following more or less formalised rules, and do so
independently from national governments. It is particularly hopeful to see highly
progressive cities in countries that are very conservative when it comes to taking
climate action – for instance those that have (or had initially) not ratified the
Kyoto Protocol or the Paris Agreement (Lee, 2015). Yet the room cities have for
climate action is shaped by the prevailing national, political and legal context
(Johnson et al., 2015). In particular, the national, legal and policy setting hampers
what cities can do locally in terms of self- and facilitative governance, limiting
the possibilities for self-organisation by cities (Schroeder and Bulkeley, 2009;
Schragger, 2016). Thus, some of the high hopes that have been expressed about
the benefits of polycentric climate governance are not being borne out in practice.
This begs the need for a more critical approach to studying polycentric urban
climate governance than has hitherto been the case.
To conclude, it is difficult to determine whether polycentric urban climate
governance will be ‘the key to addressing the global climate change problem’
(C40, n.d.). It is encouraging that city governments and other urban leaders
have begun to reach out to each other, have begun to take climate action that
reaches beyond action taken by nation states, and have not been unduly held
back by the lack of formal (inter)national recognition. It is troublesome,
however, that polycentric urban climate governance has been studied only in
a relatively small number of cities, that we have a limited knowledge base
about whether it really delivers on its promises, and that we have a very poor
understanding of what this approach to governing means in areas with the very
highest levels of urbanisation, namely those in the global South, and particu-
larly Asia and Africa.
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